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This study concerns the relationship between defense expenditures
and economic growth between 1961 and 1976 in the Republic of Korea.
The chief emphasis is on statistical and economic analysis of the re-
lationships between the defense burden (defense expenditures as a per-
cent of GNP) and the GNP growth rate (rate of change in 1970 constant
value of GNP). Also considered is the effects of investment rates,
foreign aid receipts, and other economic variables concerning this
re I at ionsh i p.
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I . INTRODUCTION
The economy of the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) has grown very rapid-
ly and remarkably since 1961. This study concentrates on the relative-
ly short but significant period from 1961 to 1976. In 1976, the Gross
National Product (GNP) of R.O.K. reached a record 4,757 billion won in
1970 terms. This is a 400 percent increase if compared to the GNP of
1961 of 1185 billion won. During this period, defense expenditures
have increased from 66 billion won to 277 billion won. This is a 420
percent increase when compared to 1961 [see Appendix statistical dataH.
The Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) must meet two burdens. One is the
development of the nation's economy. The other burden is national
security in the form of national defense. After World War II, the na-
tion was divided into two parts, North and South. From that time the
Korean people have had to endure a heavy defense burden. In recent
years, the arms race between North Korea and the Republic of Korea
(R.O.K.) has become more severe. According to the World Military Expen-
diture and Arms Trade (1975) [6], in just one decade (1965-1975), R.O.K.
has spent the total amount of $3,655 billion on defense. in 1973 con-
stant U.S. dollars, this required an annual average of 4 percent of
GNP. On the other hand North Korea nas spent $6,425 billion, or a
13.6 percent of the annual average of GNP. Thus, North Korea has dedi-
cated approximately two times the amount of internal spending for de-
fense purposes than has the R.O.K.
Considering that R.O.K. is under the constant threat of bellicose
challenge from tne North, and that military aid from the United States

has almost ceased (i.e. most U.S. troops in Korea will be gradually
withdrawn beginning in 1977), R.O.K. will have to provide the huge
amount of the defense budget through her own efforts. This suggests
that the Korean defense budget might be increased even more in the
future since a large portion of defense assets were obtained from U.S.
military aid. This heavier defense burden on the GNP will strain other
economic development plans.
This thesis deals with the relationship between defense expenditure
and economic growth between 1961 and 1976 in R.O.K. The chief emphasis
is on the statistical and economic analysis of the relationship between
the defense burden (defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP) and
growth factors of the economy, so as to gain insight for future economic
p lann i ng.
In Chapter II, general growth of the economy and patterns of change
concerning the major structural factors of the economy are briefly dis-
cussed. Chapter Ml is devoted to the statistical analysis of the chief
variables, covering both the statistifal results and the methodological
problems encountered. Statistical hypothesis testing methodology is
used to determine if there is a strong relationship between the variables
or between one variable and another set of variables by a mu I ti -regres-
sion analysis. Since defense expenditures have been composited in the
past from both the nation's own budget and U.S. military assistance;
under the assumption of no military assistance from the U.S., past data
can be adjusted to show what the R.O.K. would have had to bear alone in
terms of a defense burden during that period. In Chapter III, the sta-
tistical analysis is shown in two ways; one is the relationship on the
assumption that the portion of defense expenditure is borne only by the

R.O.K., and the other is the relationship on the assumption that de-
fense expenditures include both the nation's own budget and the mili-
tary assistance. Since the mid I970 ! s the R.O.K. government has
assumed most of the burden of defense. Hence the assumption of in-
cluding military assistance in the past domestic burdens gives the
model more predictive power.
In summary, this thesis discusses the effect of the defense burden
to the Republic of Korea and will also provide a basis for further
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I I . THE ECONOMY
A. BACKGROUND OF THE ECONOMY
After World War II, Korea was divided and occupied by two victorious
allies. South of the 38th parallel line, the country was occupied by
the United States of America and north of it by the Soviet Union. The
joint occupation of this nation by the two powers led to the current
division of the nation into two hostile political entities. With in-
auguration of the Republic of Korea in the southern half of the country
in August 1948, the newly established government exerted serious efforts
to restore a semblance of order for the national economy. The favor-
able trends thus set off in the national economy as evidenced by a
record GNP growth of 9.7 percent in 1949 were brought to an abrupt and
total halt when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. The Korean
economy was thrown once again into chaos. The Korean War (1950-1953)
reduced to ashes almost all industrial potential of the country. The
total damage inflicted by the three-year war was estimated at $3 billion.
The annual economic growth of the country suffered a 15.1 percent set-
back in 1950 and 6 percent in 1951, gaining only I percent in 1952 p9].
The Korean Armistice took effect on July 27, 1953. The government
concentrated its effort on the rehabilitation of the war-devastated
country, while trying to strengthen the defense capability. As a result,
during the 1954-1957 period, real GNP grew rapidly, averaging about 5
percent per annum. In 1957 the nation achieved a record 7.7 percent
economic growth. The only relatively bad year was 1956 when agricultural'

production declined almost 6 percent. Mining and manufacturing output
grew by about 15 percent per annum. By contrast the period 1958 to
I960 was one of declining GNP growth, and began a downward curve to
5.2 percent in 1958, 3.9 percent in 1959, and 1.9 percent in I960, re-
spect i vel y (Tab le II).
The decline in economic growth was attributed mainly to the gradua
reduction of foreign aid to Korea. In fact, during the period the
Korean economy was dependent upon U.S. grant aid. Almost all raw
materials, consumer goods, imported grains and foodstuff supplied in
the nation were purchased with U.S. grant aid funds.
TABLE I I
Annual Growth Rate of Major Sectors
1954 to I960
( 1970 Constant Prices)
Agricu It ure, Mi n i ng Soc ial Overhead
Forest ry and Cap i ta
1
Year GNP and Fish ing Ma nufactur i ng an d Services
1954 5.5 i 7.6 ct 1 1 .2 % 2.5 %
1955 5.4 2.6 21.6 5.7
1956 0.4 -5.9 16.2 4.0
1957 7.7 9.1 4.7 5.8
1958 5.2 6.2 3.2 3.5
1959 3.9 -1 .2 9.4 7.5
I960 1 .9 -1 .3 10.4 2.8
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973.
B. GENERAL GROWTH OF ECONOMY AND FIVE YEAR PLANS
Since 1961 the government has managed the economy as an integral and
vital part of a garrison staTe. From 1961 to 1976, the government had
successfully established First, Second and Third Five-Year Economic
Plans (1962-1966, 1967-1971, 1972-1976). The First Five Year Plan

(1962-1966) -adopted an "unbalanced" approach to economic growth and
laid down a philosophy of development keyed to industrialization. The
overall strategy was to concentrate on three key, or leading, sectors:
electric power, agriculture and "social overhead capital." The
expansion of hydroelectric and thermal power capacity, including an
increasing output of coal for fuel, was intended to provide the basis
for an expansion of key industrial production. The aim of expanding
agricultural output was to achieve self-sufficiency in food grain pro-
duction and consumption by 1966. The expansion of social overhead
capital envisioned concentration on the use of unemployed and under-
employed rural labor to build roads, multipurpose dams, and urban
pub I ic works D 9].
Under the first plan, economic progress surpassed most planned
goals in all sectors except agriculture. Consequently, a substantial
increase in national and per capita incomes was achieved. The Gross
National Product (GNP) showed an actual increase of about 8 percent in
real terms. The population grew by less than had been anticipated,
so that actual increases in GNP per capita from $87 (U.S.) to $126
(U.S.) and in private consumption per capita were higher than expected.
The realized export was increased from $54 million (U.S.) in 1962 to
$250 million (U.S.) in 1966. This export level was nearly double the
goal level (see Figure I).
The most important aspects of economic development under the first
plan was the growth of mining and manufacturing at an average annual
rate of 14.1 percent, social overhead capital and services 3.3 percent,
with agriculture (including forestry and fisheries) reaching only 5.1

































































































TABLE I I I
ANNUAL GROWTH RATE OF MAJOR SECTORS (AS CUMULATIVE GROWTH RATE)
1970 CONSTANT MARKET PRICES
Ag ricult ure, Mi n ing Social Overhead
Forest ry and Cap i ta
1
YEAR GNP an d Fisheries Manufactures and Serv i ces
1961 4.8 1 1.9 3.6 -1. 1
1962 3.1 -5.8 14.1 8.9
1963 8.8 8.1 15.7 7.4
1964 8.6 15.5 6.9 3.0
1965 6. 1 -1 .9 18.7 9.9
1966 12.4 10.8 15.6 12.6
1967 7.8 -5.0 21.6 13.8
1968 12.6 2.4 24.8 15.4
1969 15.0 12.5 19.9 14.6
1970 7.9 -0.9 18.2 8.9
1971 9.2 3.3 16.9 8.9
1972 7.0 1 .7 15.0 5.3
1973 16.7 3.6 30.4 14.6
1974 8.7 5.8 17.0 4.9
1975 8.3 7.1 12.9 5.3
1976 15.3 3.3 25.1 1 1 .3
AVERAGE
1962-•66 7.7 5. 1 14.1 8.3
1967-•71 10.5 2.3 20.2 12.3
1972-•76 1 1 .0 5.3 19.9 8.4
1962-•76 9.7 4.2 18. 1 9.7
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977
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The Second Five Year Plan (1967 - 71) was essentially a medium-
term plan, presented as the next stage in meeting long-range goals.
It called for annual overall resources budgets which were to be the
basic instruments for translating plans into action. These budgets
would review progress sector by sector, allocate the overall govern-
ment fiscal budget, and devise monetary, fiscal, and trade policies
consistent with the plan's longer run goals. Basic objectives of the
second plan were virtually the same as those of the earlier plans.
Strategies to achieve these goals emphasized rapid expansion of exports,
increased mobilization of capital, efficient utilization of manpower,
and continuing financial stability 09j.
By the end of the second plan, GNP had registered an annual average
increase of 10.5 percent in real terms (see Figure 2), and per capita
GNP had doubled. The high rate of growth had been led by mining-manu-
facturing which increased the annual average 20 percent (see Table III).
During the second Five Year Plan period, the nation's commodity exports
which stood at $335 million (U.S.) in 1967, advanced to $1,132 million
(U.S. ) in 1971 (see Figure 3)
.
During the first and second Five Year Plans, the nation had achieved
a fairly high rate of growth in real terms. Following the successful
implementation of the past plans, the third such plan was launched in
1972. During the Third Five Year Economic Development plan period
(1972-76), the nation's economy was planned to grow at an average rate
of 8.6 percent and per capita GNP was forecast to go up 52 percent.
The Third Five Year Development Plan can be characterized by its
attempt to promote a "balanced economy" by 'expanding regional develop-


































































































































































































the quality of the life of workers' D3]]. These goals are sufficiently
vague but suggest a shift in emphasis from building an industrial base
and modernizing the industrial structure to rural development and re-
distributive programs. Prominently, the Third Five Year Plan targets
include achievement of self-sufficiency in food grains, raising of com-
modity exports to $3.5 billion (U.S.) by 1976, construction of heavy
and chemical industries, and promotion of "balanced regional develop-
ment" [21].
At the end of this plan, fhe nation achieved an annual average
growth of GNP of II percent in real terms which exceeded by 2.4 percent
the plan's target. The per capita GNP reached from $293 (U.S.) in 1972
to $698 in 1976, which was more than 4 times fhe target amount. The
mining-manufacturing increased an average annual 20 percent, and exports
reached from $1,676 million (U.S.) in 1972 to $7,815 in 1976. This was
an average annual growth of 31 percent and more than 2 times the target
plan. Self-sufficiency in food production, agriculture-forestry and
fisheries, was only 5.3 percent of the average annual growth which
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C. GROWTH RATE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES
I . General Trends of Structural Patterns
The marked shift in the pace of economic growth that took place
during this period (1961-1976) was accompanied by broad changes in
economic structure.
In the early 1960s the primary sector of the economy (including
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) generated approximately 40 percent
of the GNP and absorbed 63 percent of the labor force (see Table IV).
In the same period the secondary sector (including manufacturing indus-
tries and mining) provided a sharp contrast. This sector produced about
14 percent of the GNP with a little less than 9 percent of the labor
force. The social overhead capital and other services composed of con-
struction, electricity, water, sanitary services, transportation, stor-
age, communication and others, generated about 46 percent of the GNP and
employed a little over 28 percent of the labor force. In 1976, accord-
ing to the final national accounts for that year, the contribution of
the primary sector to the GNP fell to about 20 percent, and the manu-
facturing and mining sector rose to 36 percent. The social overhead
capital and other services contributed almost the same to the GNP.
Meanwhile, the employed labor force decreased to 45 percent in
the primary sector, increased about 22 percent in the secondary sector
and the social overhead cap i ta I -other services changed only from 28 per-
cent to 34 percent.
These changes continued a trend during the period of marked
changes in employment patterns and in sector contributions to the GNP,
especially in favor of manufacturing and supporting elements o+ the
economy. The greater importance of the secondary sector had occurred
23

to some extent because of a spontaneous move toward industrialization
and the high rate of growth of the secondary sector leading to an in-
crease in its relative weight which, in turn, is likely to have a
decisive influence on the aggregate rate of growth.
The structure change in the economy has profound implications
for future growth rates.
TABLE IV
Change in percent of industrial origin of GNP and labor
force by economic sector. (1970 constant market prices)
1963 1976
Sector GNP Labor force
Agri
.




Manufacturing 14.1 8.7 36.0 21.9
and mining
Social overhead 45.9 28.2 43.7 33.5
capital and others
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977.
2. Expenditure on Gross National Product
Estimates for the main expenditure categories and their percent-
age shares are presented in Table V. Gross national product is used
rather than domestic product because it includes net factor income from
the rest of the world that is spent in Korea though originating elsewhere
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types of expenditure and unusually high growth rates during the period
(1961-76) for investment (gross domestic capital formation), export,
and imports. The shares of both private and government consumption
declined as a growing portion of the national product were allocated to
investment and exports. Exports expanded more rapidly but were still
substantially smaller than imports until the early 1970s. After approxi
mately 1974, the imbalance of trade changed to a positive quantity and
at the end of 1976, exports (goods and services) exceeded about 248
b i I I ion won
.
The use of the gross national product show changes that can be
described only as radical particularly because they occurred during
the 1970's. Dependence on imports increased while a larger share of
domestic product was exported. Foreign trade was, therefore, much more
important for the Korean economy by the 1970s than it had been during
the earlier period. The chief finding is a major shift in expenditure
from consumption to investment as the growth of domestic products
accelerated. Consumption, both private and government, rose absolutely
but considerably less than it might have. An increasing share of a
rapidly growing total became available for investing in new capacity or
otherwise was available to generate greater future consumption.
3. Private Consumption
Private consumption expenditures in 1976 totaled 2871.1 billion
won at 1970 constant market prices, a real rise of 38 percent over 1971,
During this last five year period the share of GNP declined from 73.6
percent in 1971 to 60.3 percent in 1976.
Private consumption distributed by major type of expenditure
is given in Table VI. Food accounted for over half of the total during
26

the 1960s, but less than half by the 1970s. It is indicated that food
and other basic necessities still make up a larger fraction of consumer
expenditures in Korea than in other developed countries.
TABLE VI
Private Consumption
(1970 constant market prices, in % share)
Beverages
and
Food Tobacco CI oth i n g Housi ng Services Total
1961 58.0 6. 1 10.2 12.5 13.2 100.0
1966 55. 1 6.0 9.4 13.2 16.3 100.0
1971 47.0 9.6 12.3 12. 1 19.0 100.0
1976 43.6 10.2 13.3 13.7 19.2 100.0
Source: BOK Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977
4. Government Consumption
Government consumption grew least among the expenditure cate-
gories shown in Table V and the share of GNP declined from 13.8 percent
to 10.0 percent during the period (1961-76). Consumption by economic-
functional category is given in Table VII for selected years. It shows
that consumer expenditures on research, education, health, and welfare
grew during the last decade (1961-71) but after the middle 1970s
began to decline in terms of the share of GNP, during which time the
defense expenditure increased.
The changing patterns cf government consumption were influenced
by United States military assistance which declined after 1974. It
27

indicates that larger portions of government expenditures are for
defense.
TABLE VI I


















7. 1 6.3 6.3
48. 1 42.7 36.6
15.1 1 1 .5 3.8
33.0 31.2 32.4
5.2 12.0 1 1 .4
27.0 22.5 32.4
00.0
Source: B0K, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973 and 1977.
5. Investmen"
Gross domestic capital formation grew slowly and the share of GNP
during the period (1961-76) showed an annual average 22 percent of GNP for
investment, high by international standards L~2I_1. Actually, invest-
ment had doubled at the end of 1976 (see Table VIM). This increase
in investment with its multiplier effects, capacity creation, employment,
and productivity consequences was an important cause of economic develop-
ment during the period. The growth of fixed capital formation from the
selected years during the period and change in its distribution by type
or sector are shown in Table IX.
28

Table VIM. Use of Resource (percent of GNP)
(1970 constant market prices)
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE














I I .0 31 .2
11.2 27.3
[2_1 9 25.0
Source: EPB , Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977.
Table IX. Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation



























Dwe 1 1 i ng 17.7 12.1 14. 1 12.7
Non-res i dent ia 1
bldg. 20. 1 19.2 59.5 20.2 129.5 19.0 217.0 17.7
Other
construction 31.9 30.5 79.5 27.0 181 .3 26.6 319.7 26. 1
Transport
equ i pment 1 1 .1 10.6 36.4 12.4 1 15.0 16.9 222.7 18.2
Mach i nery, other
equ i pment 23.0 22.0 83.2 28.3 158.8 23.4 310.0 25.3
TOTAL 104.6 100.0 294.2 100.0 680.7 100.0 1224.8 100.0










Agricu 1 ture 13.7 1 1 .9 8.2 10.6
Mi n i ng and
manufacturi ng 21.1 20,2 36.4 29.4 136.8 20. 1 277.0 22.6
Servi ces 69.2 66. 1 172.7 58.7 488. 1 71.7 818.1 66.8
TOTAL 104.6 100.0 294.2 100.0 680.7 100.0 1224.8 100.0
Source: BOK, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1977.
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Shares of dwelling and of non-residential buildings in total
fixed capital formation declined through the period and were affected
by investment in transport equipment, machinery, and other equipment.
Grouping investment by sector shows that the mining and manu-
facturing sector received a large portion of investment in the I960's,
and again after the middle 1970s. Agriculture's share has been a small
and relatively constant 10 percent level of the total investment.
Agriculture's small investment share may also reflect the top
priority given to other sector investment during the Five-Year Plans.
D. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Foreign economic relations were of fundamental importance to the
economy as a whole and were closely interwoven with the country's
economic performance. Shifts in the structure and financing of foreign
trade have been among the most notable changes in the Korean economy
and have had a major influence on the whole development pattern.
The rapid industrial growth of the late 1960s and early 1970s depend
on the development of export markets, and changes in foreign trade.
Because of the country's close links to the industrial nations of the
noncommunist world, its economy tended to fluctuate with the swings in
economic conditions in those nations [193. In 1976 the country's foreign
economic relations continued to be dominated by Japan and the United
States. These two countries were major export markets and suppliers.
I
. Exports
The country ' s major exports are manufactured goods. This in-
cluded goods manufactured from imported raw materials and semifinished
imports, manufactured machinery and, notably, electronic products and
light industrial goods. By 1976, 90 percent were manufactured products
30

and only 10 percent were primary products. Total exports were $7,814.6
million (U.S.) which expanded more than 190 times between 1961 and 1976,
a rate of growth averaging more than 40 percent per annum (see Table X).
The largest market for Korean export in the early 1960s was
Japan, and from the middle of the 1960s onward the most important has
been the United States (see Table XI). Both countries have absorbed
more than 50 percent of Korean's exports. The remaining exports are
also split between various Asian, European, and Middle East countries.
2. Imports
The country's major imports were raw materials, and intermediate
goods that entered into the production of other goods for exports and
for domestic use. By 1976, 53 percent were raw materials and 28 percenf
were capital goods.
The most notable change in import composition has been the steady
rise in capital goods, which significantly decreased raw materials for
domestic uses, whicn, by the early I960's accounted for 80 percent of
the total imports. During 1976, this percentage was only 26 (see
Table XII). A most important fact is that raw materials for exports
was zero in the early 1960s, but rapidly increased from the middle
I960's. An annual average of 27 percent was imported in the I970's
period.
The largest supplier of Korean imports in the middle 1960s was
the U.S.A. This shifted to Japan in 1966. In 1976, Korea imported 22.4
percent from the U.S.A. and 35.3 percent from Japan (see Table XIV).
3. Foreign Aid, Loan, and I nvestment
During the period, the external resources inflow pattern was
obviously changed. Official economrc aid, which was composed with

Table X. Annual Growth Rate of Exports and Imports



















Amt. Growth rate Amt. Growth rate
40.9 24.7 283. 1 -7.3
54.8 34.0 390.1 37.8
86.8 58.4 497.0 27.4
1 19.2 37.3 364.9 -26.6
175. 1 46.9 415.9 14.0
250.3 42.9 679.9 63.5
334.7 33.7 908.9 33.7
486.2 43.3 1322.0 45.5
658.3 35.4 1650.0 24.8
882.2 34.0 1804.2 9.3
1 132.3 28.3 2178.2 20.7
1675.9 48.0 2250.4 3.3
3270.8 95.2 3837.3 70.5
4515. 1 38.0 6451 .9 68. 1
5003.0 10.8 6674.4 3.4
7814.6 56.2 8226.5 23.3
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977.
Note: Based on balance of payment.
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1961 16.6 47.4 19.3 5.8 21 .3 100.0
1962 21 .9 42.9 1 1 .2 3.3 20.7 100.0
1963 28.0 28.6 1 I .3 3.3 28.8 100.0
1964 29.9 32. 1 1 1 .4 6.4 20.2 100.0
1965 35.2 25. 1 7.4 3.9 28.4 100.0
1966 38.3 26.5 4.9 4.8 25.5 100.0
1967 42.9 26.5 6. 1 4. 1 20.4 100.0
1968 51 .7 21 .9 4.9 3.6 17.9 100.0
1969 50. 1 21 .4 6.3 4.3 17.9 100.0
1970 47.3 28. 1 4.5 4.9 15.2 100.0
1971 49.8 24.5 5.8 4.2 15.7 100.0
1972 46.7 25. 1 6.8 5.0 16.4 100.0
1973 31 .7 38.5 5.9 6.0 17.9 100.0
1974 33.5 30.9 5.7 7.8 22. 1 100.0
1975 30.2 25.5 5.8 9.3 29.2 100.0
1976 32.3 23.4 5.9 8.5 29.9 100.0
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977.
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Petro 1 eum Total
1961 13.4 - 86.6 - 100.0
1962 16.5 - 76.7 6.7 100.0
1963 20.6 - 75.2 4.2 100.0
1964 17.2 1 .7 74.7 6.4 100.0
1965 12.9 2.2 78.6 6.2 100.0
1966 24.0 14. 1 56.2 5.7 100.0
1967 31 . 1 13.6 49.3 6.0 100.0
1968 36.4 14.6 44.0 5.0 100.0
1969 32.5 16.3 45.3 5.9 100.0
1970 29.7 19.5 44. 1 6.7 100.0
1971 28.6 21 . 1 42.4 7.9 100.0
1972 30.2 27.3 33.9 8.6 100.0
1973 27.4 26.7 38.9 7.0 100.0
1974 27.0 29.8 28.3 14.9 100.0
1975 26.3 30.0 25.4 18.3 100.0
1976 27.7 27.4 26.0 18.9 100.0
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977
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Mari ne Mi n i ng Manufactured
Year Products Products Products Goods Total
1961 21 .9 17.7 42.2 18.2 100.0
1962 23.0 22.0 28.0 27.0 100.0
1963 13.3 15.5 19.5 51 .7 100.0
1964 10.4 19.9 18. 1 51 .6 100.0
1965 8.7 13.7 15.3 62.3 100.0
1966 9.5 14.7 13.4 62.4 100.0
1967 4.7 14.7 10.5 70. 1 100.0
1968 4.3 10.2 8.2 77.3 100.0
1969 4.2 9.4 7.4 79.0 100.0
1970 3.0 8.2 5.2 83.6 100.0
1971 2.8 7.7 3.5 86.0 100.0
1972 2.9 7.6 1 .8 87.7 100.0
1973 3. 1 7.2 1 .5 88.2 100.0
1974 2.8 5.3 1 .7 90.2 100.0
1976 2.7 6.4 1 . 1 89.8 100.0
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977
35







1961 45.4 21 .9 2. 1 9.5 21 . 1 100.0
1962 52.2 25.9 1 .8 6. 1 14.0 100.0
1963 50.7 28.4 4.0 5.0 1 1 .9 100.0
1964 50.0 27.2 2.8 6.7 13.3 100.0
1965 39.3 36.0 3.9 3.8 17.0 100.0
1966 35.4 41 .0 2.8 3. 1 17.7 100.0
1967 30.6 44.5 4.0 3.6 13.3 100.0
1968 30.7 42.7 2.5 6. 1 18.0 100.0
1969 29. 1 41 .3 3.2 6. 1 20.3 100.0
1970 29.5 40.8 3.7 5. 1 20. 1 100.0
1971 28.3 39.8 4. 1 5.4 22.4 100.0
1972 25.7 40.9 5.8 5.6 22.0 100.0
1973 28.3 40.7 5.6 4.7 20.5 100.0
1974 24.8 38.3 5.4 3.4 29.2 100.0
1975 25.9 33.5 4.5 4.3 31 .3 100.0
1976 22.4 35.3 4.0 4.7 33.6 100.0
Source: EPB, Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1977
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Public Law 480 and Agency for International Development (AID) from the
U.S.A. , was changed from $200 m i I I i on in I 96 1, toonly $1.7 mill! on in
1976. Otherwise, loan and foreign investment, which started in 1962,
accelerated (see Table XV). These implicated that the Korean economy
changed from depending on foreign aid economy to self-sufficiency,
thereby, expanding the domestic economic pattern.
E. THE DEFENSE AND THE ECONOMY
Since the outbreak of the Korean War the Korean peninsula remained
one of the world's most heavily armed regions. The active armed forces
of Korea in 1976 totaled over 600,000 officers and men. The great
majority of these were in the army (more than 500,000 men), the sixth
largest ground force in the world [19]].
The direct and indirect impact of the military establishment on the
economic life of Korea since the Korean war was and is very great.
Both the size of the standing armed forces and the amount and sophisti-
cation of the armament were, before the 1970s at least, beyond the capa-
city of the nation's economic base to sustain without United States
military assistance.
Defense expenditures accounted for about 32.4 percent of the nation's
budget in 1976; during the period (1961-76) annual average defense
expenditure was 27.5 percent of the budget and 4.4 percent of GNP (see
Figure 5). Budgeting expenditures represented only a portion of the
total economic cost of the military establishment. Defense expenditures
did not include contribution to the defense forces and the defense-
related inflow structure through the Military Assistance Program (MAP)
and other forms of United States military-related assistance. The
















































CN — •*t o ^r — r» CN ^r LO ON CO o <v|- CN (f\
in M3 MO ^r m <3- ;3- vO LP\ ^Q vD p~ CO — CO mo
ON O — KA MO
rO CN
in
CN C^ m m p- cn cn co
in n p- CN O M3 Cn CN CO ^r m C* m3 p» cn
^o p^ CO m in r~ CO CN 0> MO cn m p- m m ON







mo m cn co m
























m m in m m m mo
cn cn mo cn — m
cn m — rr m o























— — — — — — CNCN
cn cn cn ^r co o — vomp-c^^op-K^^rn
— cNp-voocNOCNminn — ooooMDp^MO^r-xt-mrnmmcN —
CN
cn CN «* <3* <j\ o O On o in CO co o p- in
cn ^r p- co M3 CN cn — CN •^r CN n cn '.O oo mj
— CN CN — — CN ^r ^r mo in MO p- CO p- a cn
co o cr\ in
MO CN CTn •£>
CN — —
CO
CO p- cn in o — CO CO CO MO CO
o MO ON p- o ^r CN CN m CO OA
— — CN <* <tf- in VO uO MO co CO
— CN m <* LH MO p- CO OA o — CN m vT in >0
MO o MO MD MO O MD MO MO p- p- p- p~ P- r- r-


























































































In Figure 5 it is shown that the defense budget peaked by 33.2 percent
in 1964, and gradually decreased to 22.8 percent in 1969. From this
point the defense budget increased again, and hit 32.4 percent in 1976.
One of the important properties of the defense budget was this "V shape"
(1964-1976) which has a highly negative correlation with United States
military assistance. In 1964, military assistance was notably dropped
and from the early 1970s gradually decreased (see Table XVI). These
implied that the portion of decreasing military assistance had to be
borne by the nation's budget. This increasing defense burden affected
the nation's other economic activities.
Some of the positive fiscal impact was the direct involvement of the
military elite and military institutions in the nation's economic life.
Managerial and technical orientation were emphasized on economic develop-
ment and focused considerable productive energies of the nation's
successful five-year plans. Large numbers of officers and servicemen
entered both the private and the public sectors when they finished their
duty services in military, with their managerial and technical skills
as civilian-related skills stemming from their training in military.
Also, under the civic action program promoted by the military, soldiers
built and repaired roads, dams, and schools. Transportation and equip-
ment were provided to meet The local needs. One of the most important
facts was the general policy to use the armed forces and military facili-
ties for disaster assistance and in large public projects such as flood
control. These activities had an important and usually beneficial
effect on the nation's economic life.
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Table XVI. U.S. Military Assistance
Converted
Year In Million U.S.$ Billion 1970 Won Percent of GNP
1961 192.2 59.7 5.0
1962 136.9 42.5 3.5
1963 173.8 54.0 4.1
1964 124.4 38.6 2.7
1965 173. 1 53.8 3.5
1966 161 .8 50.3 2.9
1967 169.4 52.6 2.8
1968 253.4 78.7 3.8
1969 137.9 42.8 1 .8
1970 136.6 42.4 1 .6
1971 293.2 74.3 2.6
1972 155.8 48.4 1 .6
1973 149. 1 46.3 1.3
1974 94.0 29.2 0.7
1975 82.6 25.7 0.6
1976 62.4 19.4 0.4
Source: a. Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSAA
Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance Facts,
1975 and 1976 (Column 2. 1966 to 1976).
b. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Special Report Prepared
for the House Foreign Affairs Committee
(Column 2. 1961 to T965, Reference 10, p. 250).

III. STATISTICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS BETWEEN
DEFENSE BURDEN AND GROWTH RATE FACTORS
A. METHOD AND CONCEPTS
This chapter deals with the relationship between the defense burden
and the major economic growth factors by using the statistical and
economic analysis based on the 16 year observed period. This analysis
was conducted using Spearman correlation, and regression analysis in
the SPSS package as well as multiple regression equations. A confidence




Correlation coefficient indicates the degree to which variation
(or change) in one variable is related to variation (change) in another.
A correlation coefficient not only summarizes the strength of associa-
tion between a pair of variables, but also provides an easy means for
comparing tne strength of relationship between one pair of variables
and a different pair L~20_l.
Mathematically, the value of the coefficient may range from a
perfect positive correlation (+1.0), through no relationship (0.0), to
a perfect negative correlation (-1.0). However, the interpretation of
the value of a correlation coefficient is purely relative to the circum-
stances under which it was ootained and should be interpreted in the
I ight of those circumstances.
2. Regression Analysis
The correlation coefficient is a useful index for evaluating
the correlation between the variables, but this information cannot give
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a clear prediction. Regression analysis is a statistical tool which
uses the relation between two or more quantitative variables so that
one variable can be predicted from the other or others. For example,
in simple regression analysis, values of the dependent variable are
predicted from a linear function of the form,
Y = A + BX
where y = the estimated value of the dependent variable Y
B = constant by which a I I values of the independent
variable X are multiplied
A = constant which is added to each case
Residual = Y - Y T
E(Y - Y f ) 2 = SS = minimum
res
(The sum of squared residuals is smaller than any possible
a I ternati ve va I ues.
)
It can be shown that the optimum values for B and A are obtained from
the following formulas L~I7_]:




A = Y - BX
Through the use of regression analysis, we can predict an unknown vari-
able Y' when the value of another variable X is known.
B. SIMPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
I . Defense and Growth Rate of Gross National Product
An overview of the changing level of defense expenditure as a










































from this observed period (1961-1976). Actually the nation's defense
burden is more than this amount, because the United States military
assistance was spent for the nation's defense purpose. When the author
attempted regression analysis, the correlation coefficient between de-
fense burden and growth rate of GNP was too weak (0.27) and also was
statistically not significant at the 5% level. It was found that the
nation's defense expenditure was not only dependent on GNP growth,
but also United States military assistance.
During this period, military assistance was more than the aver-
age annual 2.4 percent of GNP when converted to the value of the Korean
Won in the I970's. This percentage indicated that United States bore
more than half of the Korean defense burden during that period. It
has always -been assumed that Korea would one day bear the whole defense
burden in her own budget. From 1969, military assistance obviously de-
creased. In 1976, the military assistance was only 0.4 percent of GNP.
From this fact the nations' future defense expenditure can be predicted
by statistical analysis. This can be accomplished by including in the
defense expenditure past military assistance portions. The growth rate
of GNP was a marked annual average 9.5 percent, for 1961 and 1962, and
then more than 10 percent cumulative growth rate. The Koren economy was
at the takeoff stage in 1963; during the period the GNP growth of 16.7
percent peaked in 1973.
When the defense burden included military assistance, the corre-
lation coefficient between defense expenditures and GNP was 0.9359
which was statistically significant at the 5% level, while the defense
burden and growth rate of GNP was -0.5226; a negative correlation which
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was also statistically significant. The result can be written as a
simple regression equation,
Defense burden = 8.87 - 0.5226 (Growth rate of GNP)
(DF: 1,14. F value: 5.26)
These results suggest that Korea did not suffer a heavy rise
in defense burden in comparison with the rapid growth rate of GNP,
although the amount of defense spending increased. Changes in GNP are
the major explanatory factor for all variables except military assist-
ance and foreign economic aid; these having decreased relatively.
The relationship between defense expenditure and GNP was nighly
positively correlated, but defense burden to the growth rate of GNP was
an inverse relationship.
2. Defense and the Investment Rate
Next to defense, an important factor is investment, the gross
domestic capital formation as a percent of GNP. If defense expenditure
diverts resources from investment, it should be found that an inverse
relationship between defense expenditure and the investment rate exists.
The correlation coefficient between the defense burden and the
investment rate was -0.7476. What this means is that Korea continued
to shift more money to investment from defense spending or other resources,
When compared with the other expenditures of GNP, the investment was
highly negatively correlated to the government consumption expenditures;
the correlation coefficient was -0.8508, and with private consumption
expenditure was -0.8313 (see Appendix computer output).
Meanwhile, the relationship between growth rate of GNP and
investment was a positive correlation of 0.6501, which indicated that
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the increasing investment rate positively affected the nation's economic
growth. Above all, these correlations are statistically significant.
Combining the results, it can be concluded that investment was the most
dominant factor of the Korean economy.
3. Relation between Defense and Consumption Expenditure
- Industrial Origin of GNP
The simple correlation between the defense burden and government
consumption expenditures was 0.9042 and private consumption was 0.7277,
of those that were significant. However, these two major consumption
expenditures of GNP indicated that nation's consumption expenditures were
changed by that period, and that portions of GNP were gradually decreased,
This can be clearly explained from the relationship between the growth
rate of GNP. The simple correlations of -0.6276 and -0.6459 showed them
to be individually negatively correlated. These suggest that Korea spent
more money for other sectors by increasing GNP growth.
The relationships between the defense expenditure and industrial
origin of GNP were highly positively correlated, while to the defense
burden, in terms of a portion of GNP, quite different relationships
were shown.
Correlation between agriculture (including forestry-fisheries)
and defense burden was 0.7289, -0.7109 for mining-manufacturing sectors.
The social overhead cap i ta I -other services sector was too weak with an
inverse correlation coefficient of -0.2473, which was not significant at
5% level .
From this industrial group analysis, it was concluded that this
group obviously contributed to the GNP during the period. Except for the
mining-manufacturing sector, the other two sectors did not contribute as
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strongly to the GNP growth. The defense burden was not affected signi-
ficantly by the mining-manufacturing sector.
4. Relation between Foreign Trade
A nation's international balance of payments is often a major
casualty of sharp increase in defense expenditures. The Korean situa-
tion is not unusual; some potential exports have been diverted to
satisfy internal demand. In 1976, Korea imported goods and services
were about 1,398 billion won (1970 constant market prices); while ex-
porting goods and services were 1.646 billion won. Over the period of
this survey, the correlation coefficient between them was 0.9679, which
was statistically significant. The simple correlation between defense
expenditure and these items was a highly positive relationship, 0.9552
for exports, 0.9265 for imports. On the whole, the defense burden and
these items in terms of portion of GNP were negatively correlated with
-0.6907 for exports and -0.7016 for imports. But the correlation be-
tween growth rate of GNP and these items was a positive relationship;
export was 0.5255, and import was 0.5578. All were significant.
These statistical data suggest that both were increased by the
same GNP factor. Also, the data was positively affected by the nation's
economic growth. Furthermore the relationship with the defense burden
has shown some meaningful suggestion that both foreign trade factors
were more rapidly changed compared to the defense burden. If these
simple correlations are positively related, then it could be predicted
that the defense burden depends upon the foreign trade trends which would





5. External Resources and Others
During the observed period, Korea has received various types
of inflowing resources from foreign countries. An average annual 5.8
percent of GNP, economic aid, loan, foreign investment, and military
aid.
By the year to year analysis in Chapter II, the inflowing ex-
ternal resources changed its trends and types. In the early 1960s most
of external resources were economic aid, and after 1966 the pattern was
changed from economic aid to loan and foreign investment. Also, mili-
tary aid decreased since 1969. But these resources encouraged, promoted
and changed the nation's economic development and economic patterns from
a dependent to an independent economy.
The simple correlation between the GNP and total external re-
sources was highly positively correlated as 0.9514. A positive correla-
tion of 0.8697 for defense expenditure is also statistically significant
at the 5% level. Between the defense burden and external resources, in
terms of a portion o* GNP, correlation was 0.0909 and was statistically
not significant. But military assistance and defense burden were statis-
tically significant (r = 0.8783, F = 47).
From these results the author found that the total external
resources affected the nation's build up greatly. However, it was not
correlated with the defense burden, which was dependent upon military
ass i stance.
Next the simple correlation between the armed forces size and
population was 0.9421, while defense burden and armed forces size was
0.8678, both of which were significant. These suggest that armed forces
size did not change but steadily maintained its size. In accordance
with the World Arms Trades (1975), Korean active armed forces were
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estimated at 634,000 men. This size was maintained during the observed
period.
Considering the military services and economic effects in a de-
veloping country, the military establishment is an important force for
modernization. If it is to be at all effective, it has to be largely
utilitarian and efficiency-oriented in its approach. It also inculcates
in those it trains a great many modern attitudes and aptitudes C 1 0l] •
Therefore, maintaining the size of the armed forces has not only nega-
tive effects, but also some positive secondary effects for the nation's
economic growth.
C. MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In multiple regression analysis, the prediction equations were
defined by two major groups; one was the prediction models of the
defense expenditure based on the basic data (actual budget), and the
other was the defense burden based on the composition data (.% of GNP).
Also, the equations of each group were performed on its own budget;
including U.S. military assistance.
AM of the equations of the model were estimated initially using
ordinary stepwise linear regression analysis methods. The final
results of four key multiple regressions are presented. The last stage
of stepwise regression analysis after variables have been entered and
their effects computed are also presented. (More detailed information
on each step of the calculation is given in the Appendix.)
I . Predictive Model of Defense Expenditure (Basic Data)
a. Defense Expenditure (Own Budget)
The stepwise linear regression discussed above resulted
in the following multiple linear regression equation:
50







where independent variables are:
x~: Government consumption expenditure
x-,: Private consumption expenditure
x^: Investment (Gross capital formation)
The F ratio for the whole regression is 321 which indicates
that the level of the test is higher than 0.01 (DF: 3,12), that is,
the probability that all of the regression coefficients are not zero
is at least 0.99. This multiple regression coefficient shows the joint
relationship of defense expenditure to a set of variables of GNP;
government consumption expenditure, private consumption expenditure, and
'
i nvestment.
The F ratio test for each regression coefficient in the
equation above along with the associated probabilities are listed as
fol lows:
Regress ion














b„ 0.0876 8.7 0.99
The value of the multiple correlation coefficient (R) for
this equation was 0.9938. Therefore, the value of the coefficient of
2
multiple determination (R ) for this regression was 0.9877, i.e.,
approximately 99% for the variation in the dependent variable (defense





b. Defense Expenditure (Including U.S. Military Assistance)
A multiple linear regression was performed using the in-
dependent variables x~,x-,, and x,.
defense expenditure = -25.4 + l.44x - 0.09x^ - 0.08x.v 2 ;> 4
The results of this multiple linear regression were:
Regress ion












Determination coefficient (R )
Overa II F va I ue
Degree freedom (PF)
Probabi I ity that b. ^










2. Predictive Model of Defense Burden (Composition Data)
a. Defense Burden (Own Budget = % of GNP)
A linear regression was performed relating the percent of
GNP. The resulting equation was:






defense burden (portion of defense expenditure
to the GNP)
x„: portion of government consumption
expenditure to the GNP.
X-,: portion of private consumption
expenditure to the GNP.
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The computed overall F-va I ue of this equation was 7.9; the
meaning in this case is that the probability that the value of the
regression coefficient was actually zero is 0.01. The coefficient of
correlation was 0.7415 and the proportion of variation in the independent
variable accounted for is approximately 0.5498.
b. Defense Burden (Including U.S. Military Assistance)
The resulting equation was:
defense burden = -3.05 + |.58x« - O.llx,
The F ratio test for each regression coefficient in the equation above
along with the associated probabilities are listed below:
Regress ion









Determination coefficient (R .
Overa I I F-va I ue
Degree freedom
Probabi I ity, b. t
3. Selection of Predictive Models
The following discussion refers to the predictive model reported
above I , 2.
Four equations were found to be statistically related to
defense expenditure.
Probab i 1 i ty










The author chose two equations including the analysis con-
tained with military assistance because of the historical perspective
for Korean defense expenditure as too much affected by the U.S.
military assistance and more useful for prediction power for the future,
The predictive models are:
a. Basic Data
defense expenditure = -25.4 + I .44x^ - 0.09x, -0.08x
b. Composition Data





IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
fn conclusion, this study has shown that the Korean economic devel-
opment has accelerated significantly from 1963. These accomplishments
occurred in spite of high defense burdens pressed by the demands of
the arms race with North Korea and the fact that military aid from the
U.S. has almost ceased.
During the period 1961-1976, the trends of the economic structural
patterns changed from emphasis in the primary sector to the secondary
sector. The contribution of the primary sector to the GNP decreased,
with the secondary sector rising in conjunction with employment patterns,
Economic data indicates that the Korean economic standard of living,
in real terms, has shown significant improvements during the past 16
years.
The expenditure consumptions have expanded in absolute size and
proportionately. However, the portion of GNP was decreased. In
regression analysis, the positive correlation between the defense
burden and the growth rates of GNP that might be anticipated did not
appear. On the contrary, the simple correlation between the defense
burden and growth rates of GNP was negative: Korea with high growth
rates of GNP did not tend to have high defense burden, and vice
versa. The defense burden, which was 10.6 percent in 1961, had fallen
to 6.2 percent by 1976, with an annual average for 1961-1976 of 6.9
percent. The downward trend of the Korean defense burden is another
reason why its growth rates of GNP are relatively so high.
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The investment portion of GNP was the most distinct factor which
was continuously rising among the sectors of the economy. Combining
this fact with a steadily decreasing relative defense burden has per-
haps enabled investment to rise.
A continuing high level of investment positively affected the nation's
economic growth which indicated that Korean economic achievement was
dependent on its investment efforts rather than on defense or other
purposes.
The external resources from foreign countries, especially from U.S.
economic aid and military assistance, were tangible. If these were not
supported by military assistance, the Korean government would have had
to raise taxes in order to make up part of that portion of the defense
burden. In so doing, it is likely that a major portion of these taxes
would have reduced private savings and business investment would have
been curtailed. Circumstantially then, such aid was clearly intended
to make it possible for Korea to maintain a large military effort, and
at the same time to achieve rapid economic progress. Korean resources
could then be made available for economic development.
The maintenance of a large military complement would cause not only
a high defense burden, but would also contribute valuable economic in-
puts to it. Specifically, The defense programs make tangible contribu-
tions to the economic development by providing civic actions such as
education and medical care, as well as vocational and technical training,
engaging in a variety of public work functions— building of roads, dams,
and disaster relief, etc., and engaging in scientific and technical
specialties. Military forces also engage in certain research, develop-
ment and production activities which diffuse skills, thereby contributing
promotion for the secondary economic efforts.
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The crucial determinant in Korea's economic and military future
appears to hinge on three things: First, the amount of military
pressure exerted by North Korea
—
which has occasionally acted with
disconcerting rashness pO~J; second, the amount of military and economic
help will not be provided by the alliance as in the past— it will be
borne by the own efforts of R.O.K. ; third, the amount of defense
expenditure will be increased in the future, and the economic develop-
ment pattern will be maintained at least to 1 970 ' s growth rates.
Areas of further investigation, which are beyond the scope of this
thesis, are suggested as follows:
a. A statistical analysis of the effects of diverting to invest-
ment resources presently given over to defense requirements.
b. An analysis of the effects on investment and economic growth
of either increasing or decreasing resources allocated to defense re-
qu i rements.
c. The development and application of statistical prediction pro-
cedures, as applied to the regression model, to define the optimal de-
fense burden, consistent with political and economic variables at the
time, that the Republic of Korea can bear.
57





2. BASIC DATA- 1 : ACTUAL BUDGET & ACTUAL AMOUNT
3. BASIC DATA-2 : MILITARY ASSISTANCE INCLUDED IN DEFENSE
EXPENDITURE
4. COMPOSITION DATA-I : AS % OF GNP EXCEPT Y, X 1 3, XI 4, XI5, AND
XI6
5. COMPOSITION DATA-2 : MILITARY ASSISTANCE INCLUDED IN DEFENSE





XI = DEFENSE EXPENDITURE
X2 = GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
X3 = PRIVATE EXPENDITURE
X4 = GROSS INVESTMENT
X5 = AGRI., FORESTRY & FISHERIES
X6 = MINING & MANUFACTURING
X7 = SOCIAL OVERHEAD CAPITAL & OTHER SERVICES
X8 = EXPORTS
X9 = IMPORTS
XI = EXTERNAL RESOURCES (ECONOMIC AID + LOAN + FOREIGN INVESTMENT)
XII = EXTERNAL RESOURCES (ECONOMIC AID + LOAN)
XI2 = U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE
XI 3 = POPULATION
XI 4 = ARMED FORCES
XI 5 = GNP PER CAPITA
XI 6 = DEFENSE PER CAPITA











































-0 in J- r\j
r^ a> o _, 03
•U —4 u^ o LU
O c* O pH r\J
r«4 iH ~-«














o o* -i- o
rr\ cA J- J-
0* O
CO r-t
h- r» r* o
in
-o ~-i rg *-«
r» *r w














































o — c-J •r
lt*\ cr, i— r~





»VJ —I •-» Cj
(J\ (.) r-t CO
^ O *-J U3












-T u* V' (
>
r» •J- rn o r 111 -r ^
-O gj iA
^ --» 'J •«J "* "", ™ c
-J* •x V* LU r"' (J>
w
^
U JJ -< V* o to rH IVJ */• •u <v m u\ ^ i^j n






















































CL Q. M— CO
z o O +-
JJ CL
c Cl




CD CD CD c_ 1_
-H -f- — CO CD
CU ro 3 u Q.
1_ i_ CL
O i_
.c Cl CD L0
+-
-l- Cl c
2 2 M— CD
O O o CL M-
L. L. CD
CD CD '&5. CD Q
II II II II II
>- rO ^T in vO













































o o o o o o O o O o o o o O o o
X
•o CO v> f\J -0 CO ~" v>- -" ^J• .0 m (1 " H o
<J< O CO r*. to o (M -} ia \A 'A n r>-» lA r^ <7>
o O
-f- •n CO c>> O •J- c^ r» r^ •o CO rn (f| .
o IA r^» o CD o r\l I- r^ o -^ -o o CO CO i\j l^-
r-4
X <M <M fS( -" —
•
































2. SIMPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
a. ECONOMIC FACTORS WITH GROWTH RATE OF GNP-
COMPOSITION DATA-
b. ECONOMIC FACTORS WITH DEFENSE BURDEN-
COMPOSITION DATA-2
3. MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS
a. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE BASIC DATA-
I
b. DEFENSE EXPENDITURE BASIC DATA-2
c. DEFENSE BURDEN COMPOSITION DATA-
I
d. DEFENSE BURDEN COMPOSITION DATA-2
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2. Simple Regression Results
a. Economic factors with growth rate of GNP (Composition Data-I)
Variable List
Corre I at ion
Coef f ic ient
Significant Degree of












and Fisheries -0.490 4.43 (0.055 level) "
Min i ng -
manufacturi ng 0.4791 4.17 (0. 10 level ) 1!
Socia 1 overhead
capital and
other services 0. 1309 0.24 NS IT
Exports 0.5235 5.3 S (I
Imports 0.5578 6.3 S IT
Externa 1
resources 1 0.3027 1 .41 NS IT
Externa 1
resources 2 0. 1670 0.40 NS II
Mi 1 itary
ass i stance -0.4503 3.561 (0. 10 level ) IT
Popu 1 at ion -0.5143 5.0 S IT
Armed forces -0.6169 8.6 S II
GNP PER CAPITA 0.4719 4.01 (0. 10 level ) IT
Defense per
cap i ta 0.3434 1 .87 NS II
Tax 0.4554 3.66 (0. 10 level ) IT
73

b. Economic factors with defense burden (Composition Data-2)
Correlation Significant Degree of
Variable List Coefficient F Value (5% level) Freedom
,14
Growth rate of
GNP -0.5226 5.259 S
Government
Expend i ture 0.9042 62.779 S
Private
Expend i ture 0.7277 15.760 s
Gross 1 nvestment -0.7476 17.741 s
Agri., Forestry
and Fisheries 0.7289 15.868
Min ing -
Manufacturing -0.7109 14.308
Soc ia I overhead
capital and
other services -0.2474 0.912 NS
Exports -0.6908 12.775 S
Imports -0.7016 13.576 s
Externa 1
Resources 1 -0.0909 9. 1 17 NS
Externa 1
Resources 2 0.0126 - -
U.S. mi 1 i tary
ass i stance 0.3783 47.265 s
Popu 1 at ion 0.8072 26. 171 s
Armed Forces 0.8678 42.697 s
GNP PER CAPITA -0.6899 12.1715 s
Defense per
cap i ta -0.4478 3.512 NS
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